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Abstract
We study a simple graph-based classical secret sharing scheme: ev-
ery player’s share consists of a random key together with the encryp-
tion of the secret with the keys of his neighbours. A characterisation
of the authorised and forbidden sets of players is given. Moreover, we
show that this protocol is equivalent to the graph state quantum secret
sharing (GS-QSS) schemes [7, 6, 5] when the secret is classical. When
the secret is an arbitrary quantum state, a set of players is authorised
for a GS-QSS scheme if and only if, for the corresponding simple clas-
sical graph-based protocol, the set is authorised and its complement
set is not.
1 Introduction
Quantum secret sharing protocols [2, 3] are quantum extensions of the clas-
sical secret sharing protocols [1, 8]. They consists in encoding a secret into
a multipartite quantum state. Each of the players of the protocol has a sub-
part of this quantum system, called a share. Authorised sets of players are
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those that can recover collectively the secret. The encrypted secret can be a
quantum state or a classical message.
In the literature, several quantum secret schemes have been introduced
[7]. In particular Markham and Sander have introduced QSS schemes based
on graph states: the secret is encoded into a graph state, i.e. a quantum
state which is characterised by a graph. Every vertex of the graph represent
a player. Both classical and quantum secrets are considered in the graph state
quantum secret sharing schemes. In [7], connections between the authorised
sets for a classical secret and the authorised sets for a quantum secret have
been established. Recently, in [5], a graphical characterisation of authorised
and forbidden sets of players have been introduced in both cases of a classical
and a quantum secret.
In this note, we study a family of graph-based secret sharing protocols.
Given a simple undirected graph and a given secret, every player’s share is
a pair which consists of a random key together with the encryption of the
secret by modular addition with the keys of the neighbour players in the
graph (see the section 3). In section 4, we show that the access structure
of the classical graph-based protocol coincides with the access structure of
the GS-QSS when the secret is classical. As a consequence, whenever the
secret is classical, any GS-QSS can be simulated by a simple classical scheme.
Moreover, we point out the connections between the GS-QSS with quantum
secret and the classical graph based protocols: the authorised sets of players
are those which are authorised for the classical protocol for the same graph
and its complement.
2 Notations
For a given classical or quantum secret sharing protocol over n players, a
subset of players is authorised if the players of the subset can recover collec-
tively the secret. A subset of players is forbidden if they have no information
about the secret. Notice that a third kind of sets of players may exist, those
who have some partial information about the secret. The description of the
authorised and forbidden sets is called the accessing structure of the protocol.
In this paper, the protocols are characterised by simple undirected1 graphs.
1G = (V,E) is a simple undirected graph if ∀u ∈ V, (u, u) /∈ E and (u, v) ∈ E ⇒
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For a given graph G = (V,E) and for any vertex u ∈ V , N (u) := {v ∈
V | (u, v) ∈ E} denotes the neighbourhood of u in G ; for any D ⊆ V ,
Odd(D) := {v ∈ V | |N (v)∩D| = 1 mod 2} is called the odd-neighbourhood
of D in G. Notice that Odd(D) = △u∈DN (u), where △ is the symmet-
ric difference (A△B = (A ∪ B) \ (A ∩ B)). For a given subset B ⊆ V ,
let B = V \ B be its complement. For a given graph G = (V,E), let
G = (V,E \ {(u, u) | u ∈ V }) be its complement graph.
3 A graph-based classical protocol
In this section, we consider a family of classical secret sharing protocols, each
of these protocols is parameterised by a graph. For a given simple undirected
graph G = (V,E), each vertex i ∈ V represents a player. The secret to share
is a bit s ∈ {0, 1}. Each player receives the secret one-time padded by the
keys of his neighbours. Formally, the classical graph-based secret sharing
(GSS) protocol is defined as follows:
Sharing the secret.
• For each player i, pick a bit ki uniformly at random in {0, 1}.
• For each i, compute the value ci = s+
∑
i′∈N (i) ki′ mod 2.
• Give player i the couple (ki, ci).
An example of GSS protocol is given in Figure 1.
Recovering the secret. Since every player has the secret encrypted us-
ing the keys of his neighbours, it comes that each player together with his
neighbours can recover the secret. So, in the example given in Figure 1, any
superset of the following sets of players is authorised: {1, 2}, {2, 3, 4}, {4, 5}.
But not all the authorised sets are of that kind: if the players 1, 3 and 5 add
up their encrypted secret, the resulting bit is c1+c3+c5 = 3s+2k2+2k4 = s
mod 2, so the set {1, 3, 5} is also an authorised set. More generally, we
(v, u) ∈ E
3
1 3 5
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Figure 1: Top: The GSS scheme when the graph is a P5. The sums are
modulo 2. Bottom: The same protocol for s = 1 and some particular values
of ki’s.
consider the following sets of players and we show that they are authorised
sets.
Definition 1. Given a graph G = (V,E), a set B ⊆ V is c-accessing if and
only if:
∃D ⊆ B,
{
D ∪ Odd(D) ⊆ B
|D| = 1 mod 2
(1)
For a given graph G = (V,E), let B ⊆ V be a c-accessing set and let D ⊆
B such that |D| = 1 mod 2 and Odd(D) ⊆ B. In the following, we show that
the players in B can recover the secret by computing
∑
i∈D ci+
∑
j∈Odd(D) kj
mod 2.
∑
i∈D
ci +
∑
j∈Odd(D)
kj =
∑
i∈D

s+ ∑
i′∈N (i)
ki′

+ ∑
j∈Odd(D)
kj
= |D|.s+
∑
i∈D,i′∈N (i)
ki′ +
∑
j∈Odd(D)
kj
= |D|.s+
∑
i′∈V
|N (i′) ∩D|.ki′ +
∑
j∈Odd(D)
kj
= s mod 2
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As a consequence:
Property 1. Given a graph G = (V,E), any set B ⊆ V of players which is
c-accessing is an authorised set.
In the rest of the section, we show that any set which is not c-accessing is
forbidden. As a consequence, the c-accessible sets provide a characterisation
of the authorised sets. It also proves that for any graph, the protocol is
perfect, i.e. any set of players is either authorised or forbidden.
The proof is using the following characterisation of the sets which are not
c-accessing, proved in [5], stating that a set is not c-accessing if and only if
it is oddly-dominated by a subset of its complement:
Lemma 1 ([5]). Given a graph G = (V,E), B ⊆ V is not c-acessing if and
only if
∃C ⊆ B,Odd(C) ⊇ B (2)
Theorem 1. Given a graph G = (V,E), any set B ⊆ V of players which is
not c-accessible is forbidden.
Proof. Let B be a set of players which is not c-accessible. The players in
B share collectively the following bits:
(
(ki, ci)
)
i∈B
. Let kB = (ki)i∈B and
cB = (ci)i∈B. We want to show that the players in B have no information
about the secret, i.e. P (s|kB, cB) = P (s¯|kB, cB).
Notice that P (s¯|kB, cB) = P (s|kB, cB) since ∀i, ci = s¯+
∑
j∈N (i) ki. More-
over, P (s|kB, cB) =
P (s,cB|kB)
P (cB |kB)
. According to Lemma 1, there exists C ⊆ B
s.t. Odd(C) ⊇ B, i.e. ∀i ∈ B, |N (i) ∩ C| = 1 mod 2. For any i ∈ B,
ci = 1 + s+
∑
j∈N (i)
ki mod 2
= 1 + s+
∑
j∈N (i)∩C
ki +
∑
j∈N (i)∩C
ki mod 2
= 1 + s+ |N (i) ∩ C|+
∑
j∈N (i)∩C
(ki − 1) +
∑
j∈N (i)∩C
ki mod 2
= s+
∑
j∈N (i)∩C
ki +
∑
j∈N (i)∩C
ki mod 2
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As a consequence, P (cB|kB, kC) = P (cB|kB, kC) and P (s, cB|kB, kC) =
P (s, cB|kB, kC). Hence,
P (s¯|kB, cB) = P (s|kB, cB)
=
P (s, cB|kB)
P (cB|kB)
=
∑
kC∈{0,1}C
P (kC)P (s, cB|kB, kC)∑
kC∈{0,1}C
P (kC)P (cB|kB, kC)
=
∑
kC∈{0,1}C
1
2|C|
P (s, cB|kB, kC)∑
kC∈{0,1}C
1
2|C|
P (cB|kB, kC)
=
∑
kC∈{0,1}C
1
2|C|
P (s, cB|kB, kC)∑
kC∈{0,1}C
1
2|C|
P (cB|kB, kC)
=
P (s, cB|kB)
P (cB|kB)
= P (s|kB, cB)
Property 1 and Theorem 1 provide a characterisation of accessible sets.
Moreover, any set which is not c-accessible cannot learn any information
about the secret.
4 Graph state quantum secret sharing
Secret sharing with graph states (GS-QSS) has been introduced by Markham
and Sanders in [7]. For a given graph of order n, the secret – which can be
either classical or quantum – is encoded into the n-partite quantum state
described by the graph, the so called graph state [4]. Then each of the n
players receives one qubit of the quantum state.
It has been shown in [5] that, when the secret is a classical bit, every
subset of players is either authorised or forbidden, and that the authorised
sets are the c-accessing sets in the corresponding graph i.e., the subsets B
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of players such that ∃D ⊆ B, |D| = 1 mod 2 and Odd(D) ⊆ B. As a
consequence,
Property 2. Given a graph G, when the secret is a classical bit, the access-
ing structure of the GS-QSS scheme characterised by G coincides with the
accessing structure of the GSS characterised by G.
Thus, when the secret is classical, any GS-QSS protocol can be simulated
by a GSS protocol, which is simple classical protocol that consists in sending
each player only two bits. It shows, when the secret is classical, there is no
benefit to use a graph state quantum protocol rather than a fully classical
protocol.
When the secret is an arbitrary quantum state, an interesting reduction to
the classical secret case has been shown in [7]: given a graphG, a set of players
is authorised for a quantum secret in the GS-QSS protocol characterised by
G if and only if this set of players is authorised in both (i) the GS-QSS
protocol characterised by G when the secret is classical, and (ii) the GS-QSS
protocol characterised by G when the secret is classical. As a consequence:
Property 3. When the secret is an arbitrary quantum state, the authorised
sets of players in a GS-QSS scheme for a graph G are those which are au-
thorised in the two particular instances G and G of the GSS protocol.
In [5], it has been proven that a set B of players is c-accessible in both
G and G if and only if B is c-accessible in G and B is not c-accessible in
G. As a consequence, the accessing structure of a GSS protocol provides
a full characterisation of the authorised sets in the corresponding GS-QSS
protocol:
Property 4. When the secret is an arbitrary quantum state, a set B of
players is authorised in a GS-QSS scheme for a graph G if and only if B is
authorised and B is forbidden in the GSS scheme for G.
5 Conclusion
In this note, we characterise the accessing structure of a simple graph-based
secret sharing (GSS) protocol. Moreover, we show that this simple protocol
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is strongly related to the study of the graph-state quantum secret sharing
(GS-QSS) protocols. We point out that, when the secret is classical, any GS-
QSS scheme can be simulated by a GSS protocol. Moreover, when the secret
is an arbitrary quantum state, the accessing structure of a GSS provides a
full characterisation of the authorised sets in the corresponding GS-QSS: an
authorised set in the quantum case is a set which is authorised in the classical
case and such that its complement set is forbidden in the classical case.
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